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Motivation 
 
 
Is the market for CEOs 
efficient? 
Source: 
www.newyorker.com 
Outline 
• Under focus: CEO pay efficiency 
• Key findings  
• Cohort effects research & explanations for 
findings 
• Data + Empirical methodology  
• Results 
• Conclusions 
 
 
Key results 
• The market for CEOs is efficient: initial luck 
not reflected in CEO pay 
• No evidence of persistent rewards for CEOs for 
good first job 
• No procyclical cohort effects, rather 
countercyclical (IV) 
• A higher first CEO compensation if good first job 
(≈30% for top-ten firm), dissipates over time 
Cohort effects research 
• Neumark (2002): early job mkt stability 
• Oyer (2006): PhD economists 
• Oyer (2008): MBA investment bankers 
• Kahn (2010): US male college graduates 
• Kwon et al. (2010): US & Swedish workers 
(recovery phase of business cycle) 
• Oreopulos et al. (2014): CAN college graduates 
• Schoar and Zuo (2013): “recession CEOs” 
> procyclical cohort effects < 
 
 
 
Cohort effects research  - explanations 
•Productivity-based explanations  
  (human capital disparities) 
• Initial match quality 
• procyclical effects 
• countercyclical effects  
•Non-productivity based explanations 
  (downward rigidity in jobs, LT contracts, 
    signaling) 
Data 
• S&P 1,500 universe – public CEOs 
• 13,378 obs.; 1,473 companies; 2,184 CEOs 
• ExecuComp (1992-2007), BoardEx 
• Compustat + CRSP 
• NBER, US BLS, Fed 
• Full sample + subsamples; CS 
• Selection issues 
Source: Adexchanger.com 

Empirical methodology 
First placement success (firm size) → current 
placement success (CEO compensation) 
 
• Fixed effects estimation 
• Instrumental variables estimation / Two-stage 
least squares 
• Cross-section (first CEO pay) 
• Robustness checks 
 
Empirical 
methodology 
(IV/2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controls: 
Firm-level 
• size 
• inv. opportunity  
• firm 
performance 
• volatility of firm 
performance 
CEO-level 
• tenure 
• duality 
• external hire 
• education 
• gender 
 
 
CEO 
compensation 
first  
firm size 
macro cond. / 
fin. mkts 
Instruments: 
• Related to macroeconomic 
conditions: recession indicator, 
U.S. unemployment rate, 
investment-grade bond yield 
spread 
• Related to financial markets: 
1-yr volume chng., 1-yr return, 
2-yr std. dev. of S&P 500 index  
 
TDC1, TDC2 
Mkt. cap, total assets, … 
CEO talent pipeline 




Results (1) 
• FEs (firm fixed effects): <4% / no effects or lack 
of support in the data? 
(firm rank 6-12% TDC1, top ten firm 12-14.5% 
TDC1) 
• IV: 30%-50% countercyclical cohort effects 
(single instrument, reduced-form regressions) 
• Cross-section: first CEO pay up to 30% higher if 
top-ten firm 
 
Results (2) 
• Robustness: 
• IV with employment growth rate: no cohort effects 
• Cross-section: stable coefficients 
• Weak-instrument robust estimation with CLR 
confidence sets: first firm size elasticity relat. to 
current CEO compensation <-1% 
 

Conclusions / Contributions 
•  another test of CEO market efficiency 
•  existence and persistence of cohort 
effects seems to depend on the segment 
of labor market 
 
•efficient market for CEOs:  
  initial luck not reflected in CEO pay 
 
 
Thank you. 
